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Introduction
The inexorable rise in global deaths from tobacco is increasingly
driven by trends in low and middle income countries (LMICs)1 where,
by 2030, it is estimated that 6.8 million of the 8.3 million tobaccorelated deaths will occur.2 The changing global patterns of tobacco use
that underpin these mortality trends reflect the presence and actions
of the tobacco industry, whose role in expanding tobacco use
globally,3–5 has led to its label as the vector of the tobacco epidemic.
In recognition that the factors driving the tobacco epidemic,
notably the actions of the tobacco industry, transcend national
borders, the World Health Organization (WHO) used its treaty making
powers for the first time in developing the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC). Given overwhelming evidence of the tobacco
industry’s efforts to subvert public health policy making,6 the treaty
includes Article 5.3, which requires parties to protect their public
health policies from the “vested interests of the tobacco industry”.7
The FCTC, which is legally binding, entered into force in 2005 and, by
December 2014, 180 of the UN’s 193 member states were Parties to
the Treaty. Yet FCTC implementation has been slow and uneven in
large part because of tobacco industry efforts to subvert progress in
tobacco control.8
This paper provides an overview of tobacco industry practices
focusing on LMICs given (a) the growing importance of LMICs to the
tobacco industry’s future, (b) the increasing tobacco-related disease
burden faced by LMICs9 which will increase the policy priority afforded
to this issue, and (c) the potential, through effective tobacco control
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policy implementation, to prevent full escalation of the tobacco
epidemic, particularly in Africa. As well as exploring tobacco industry
market expansion tactics and policy influence generally, we examine in
detail three mechanisms through which tobacco companies are
increasingly attempting to prevent progress in tobacco control - the
use of international economic agreements, litigation and the illicit
trade in tobacco. Tobacco companies are also exploiting the
opportunities presented by harm reduction10,11 and regulatory
developments such as Better Regulation to enhance their influence12,13
but these currently have less resonance in LMICs and are not,
therefore, covered in detail. Finally, we outline how these problems
might be addressed and highlight that, despite the egregious examples
of industry influence detailed, some LMICS are exemplars in tobacco
control and show what can be achieved by prioritising health over
tobacco industry interests.14

The Tobacco Industry and Market Expansion
The importance of LMICS
Tobacco industry conduct can be understood in the context of
the global tobacco market and the growing importance of and
opportunities presented by LMICs. Historically western based tobacco
companies expanded their global sales by using investment and trade
liberalisation to enter new markets and acquire smaller companies –
Latin America in the 1970s, parts of Asia in the 1980s and the former
communist bloc in the 1990s.4,5 So assiduous was this expansion that
the global industry is now dominated by just four privately owned
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) - Philip Morris International,
British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and
Imperial Tobacco(Table w1).15 While TTCs persistently seek to make
inroads into the world’s largest and most rapidly growing market,
China (Figure 1), it remains dominated by the state owned Chinese
National Tobacco Company (CNTC), the world’s largest tobacco
company by volume, which has fiercely guarded TTCs’ access16 and is
instead emerging as a competitor, producing brands for export to
South East Asia.17 Beyond this, there are now very few additional
state-owned or private companies left to acquire (Table w1).

Lancet, Vol 385, No. 9972 (March 14, 2015): pg. 1029-1043. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

3

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Figure 1. Cigarette consumption (millions of sticks) by region (historic and forecast
data on retail volumes), 1998–2017.
Source: Euromonitor data downloaded 7th May 2014

Consequently, the TTCs’ future now depends on driving
consumption and stretching profit margins in existing markets. With
China largely closed to TTCs and consumption falling in most high
income countries (HIC), Latin America and Eastern Europe, their main
opportunities for driving consumption arise through promoting
smoking in the hitherto underexploited markets of Asia Pacific, Africa
and the Middle East, where consumption continues to increase (Figure
1).15 The greatest potential lies in Africa where the largest increases in
smoking prevalence are predicted.18 Population growth15 and the
burgeoning number of adolescents consequent to declining childhood
mortality rates9 further enhance the attractiveness of LMICs. So too do
the limited opportunities elsewhere. In HICs, the TTCs have been able
to increase profits despite declining sales19 by overshifting taxes
(increasing prices over and above a tobacco excise increase)20. Yet this
practice, on which TTCs’ share prices depend, looks increasingly
threatened.21 Finally, the opportunities e-cigarettes present may be
more limited than some had assumed - sales growth in HICs is already
slowing22 and profits on e-cigarettes remain lower than on cigarettes
with sales accounting for just 0.4% of total value in the combined,
global nicotine and tobacco market in 2013.21 Further, evidence
suggests that the tobacco industry may simply seek to harness the
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reputational and access benefits of e-cigarettes while constraining
their ability to genuinely compete with cigarettes.10,11 This is supported
by media reports that tobacco companies are arguing for greater
regulation of more innovative (refillable tank) e-cigarette products
than cig-a-like products.23

Market Expansion
The tobacco industry’s aggressive approach to market
expansion has been widely documented and shown to drive rapid
increases in tobacco use.3–5,24,25 Historic evidence shows that to drive
up sales they market heavily, sell cheaply, systematically flaunt
existing tobacco control policies and prevent future policies by
lobbying aggressively.4,26–32 While such strategies are best documented
in HICs, Latin America, parts of Asia and the former Eastern bloc, it is
clear they are being repeated worldwide (Boxes 1 and 2).33–36

Box 1
Tobacco Industry Expansion into Emerging Markets: Targeting
Women and Children
Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapidly expanding young population and
blossoming middle class makes it a prime target for tobacco industry
expansion and tobacco companies have been strategically targeting
the largely untapped opportunities there.
Historical corporate documents indicate that the sale of single stick
cigarettes, which continues to this day and makes smoking affordable
and accessible particularly for the poor and young, underpins industry
expansion in Africa33,42,43 and efforts to ban their sale have been
contested and circumvented.44,45 Numerous other efforts are made to
market cigarettes to youth. In many African countries children aged
13–15 are frequently offered free cigarettes by tobacco company
representatives.46 Recent reports document companies marketing
candy-cigarettes near schools,42 and sponsoring youth-oriented
concerts and events.47 Indirectly, youth promotion is also achieved
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities such as publicly
donating sickle cell anaemia screening machines in the Democratic
Republic of Congo48 where many children are affected by the disease,
and sponsoring the education of hundreds of children in Uganda. 49
Marketing to women and girls who, in LMICs, have lower rates of
smoking than men, is also widespread.50,51 Efforts include using ‘trend
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setters’ to promote and normalise the image of the African woman
smoker (see below) in an attempt to mollify the cultural barriers to
female smoking. The industry’s success is evidenced by the rising
uptake of smoking in girls in many developing parts of the world.24

Congo Tobacco Company Celebration of Women in Goma, Eastern
DRC, on Women’s Day, March 8 2012

Box 2
Tobacco Industry Influence in Emerging Markets: preventing,
stalling and circumventing legislation in Africa
Progress in tobacco control in Africa has been significantly hindered by
tobacco industry interference. In Kenya, it took over 13 years for the
Tobacco Control Act 2007 to be approved by Parliament and Namibia’s
Tobacco Products Control Act, initially introduced in the early 1990s,
was not passed until 2010. These delays were attributed in large part
to industry interference.33,84 In Nigeria, where tobacco control NGOs
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have pushed for limitations on tobacco industry involvement in policymaking, BAT Nigeria ran a full page advert in a July 2014 issue of The
Guardian (Nigerian) attempting to undermine the NGOs by informing
the public of the “aggressive propaganda against the Tobacco
Industry” and claiming the industry had contributed to stronger
tobacco control there and therefore “must be part of the solution”. 85 In
Uganda, where the Tobacco Control Bill was tabled in 2014, BAT
claimed that the bill, although having little impact on demand for leaf
which is almost entirely exported,86 would decimate the livelihoods of
over 14,000 farmers with negative economic consequences.87 BAT
initially cancelled their contracts with the 709 tobacco farmers from
the constituency represented by the mover of the bill and later
announced they would no longer contract any tobacco farmers in
Uganda.45,87 While BAT has now blamed the bill for these decisions, it
had previously cited the unpredictability of the tobacco crop in Uganda
as the primary reason for withdrawal, while its 2013 closure of a leaf
processing plant, relocated to Kenya, hinted that the company had
been planning its exit for several years.
Even once legislation is passed, the tobacco industry finds innovative
ways to circumvent it. For example, in Kenya mandated health
warnings on cigarette packages are often applied as removable
stickers.33 In Nigeria, BAT has been accused of misleading senior
police staff on the definition of “public places” in order to prevent
enforcement of smoke-free legislation.88 In Namibia, BAT used legal
intimidation to prevent implementation of the 2010 Act.84

Marketing
Despite tobacco industry claims that it markets only to existing
smokers to encourage brand switching, historical industry documents
make it abundantly clear that they have deliberately targeted nonsmokers, notably young people and women, and that their future
depends on driving smoking uptake among these groups.24 For
example, as one executive explained “[T]he base of our business is the
high school student”,37 while BAT’s marketing plans for its brand
Players Gold Leaf referred to targeting those aged “16+” and of “low
income low literacy”.38
The industry’s targeting of women in HICs dates back to the
1920s and linked smoking to emancipation, selling cigarettes as
‘torches of freedom’.24,39 Consequently the gender gap in smoking
narrowed in most HICs, parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe, yet
elsewhere, particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, smoking
among women remains considerably lower than men.40 Such tactics
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have, therefore, now been repeated worldwide with the industry
capitalising on social and economic change by using marketing to
make female smoking more socially acceptable (Box 1).24,39,41
Evidence indicates a causal relationship between tobacco
advertising and smoking initiation, and that even brief exposure to
advertising has an impact on adolescents.52 The high levels of
marketing observed across LMICs53,54 is therefore of major concern.
For example, large numbers of children report being given free
cigarettes by tobacco company representatives while the vast majority
(between 35% and 97% by country) of professional respondents in
schools believe the tobacco industry deliberately encourages youth to
use tobacco.53

Price
Price/tax increases are the most effective means of reducing
tobacco use.55 A key industry tactic in emerging markets, used as part
of its aggressive approach to driving up sales, is to keep prices cheap
in order to encourage uptake and establish use.15,56,57 Given the
oligopolistic nature of most tobacco markets, only in some instances
are such practices driven by genuine price competition.55 Dumping,
price discounting, absorbing taxes rather than passing them onto
smokers, using smuggling to avoid taxes (see below) and lobbying to
keep tobacco taxes low have all been documented as elements of such
a strategy.4,56,57 BAT has referred to this approach as “share at all
costs market dynamics”.15 Once smoking uptake, tobacco sales and
disposable incomes have increased sufficiently, the industry increases
prices or encourages consumers to trade up to more expensive brands
with larger profit margins; the aim as one PMI document explains, “to
trade consumers up to premium brands as economies develop”.56
Thereafter, as companies become more established in these
markets, the extent of price competition weakens, enabling pricing
above competitive levels and generating excess profits.19,55 Evidence
from as far afield as Ireland, UK, US, Jamaica and South Africa
suggests that tobacco companies then begin to overshift taxes, ie
increases prices on top of tax rises, at least on premium brands.20,55
This enables them to both increase profits and pretend that the
government, through tax increases, is solely responsible for the price
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rise.55 Simultaneously they lobby for low tobacco taxes, arguing inter
alia that price rises drive illicit trade. 58,59 Given that the industry itself
is responsible for a significant proportion of the price increase, such
arguments defy logic.20,59 What the industry is effectively appealing for
is lower taxes so that it has greater scope to increase prices (and
profits).20,59 This pattern, and the excess profits enjoyed by tobacco
companies in such markets,19 instead signal scope for governments to
further increase tobacco taxes, an opportunity that is frequently
overlooked.20,59 Where governments have increased taxes,
consumption has fallen and tax revenue increased simultaneously.55
More detailed analysis shows that, while the overall pattern in
established markets is one of overshifting, the tobacco industry
simultaneously absorbs the tax increases on its cheapest brands to
ensure their real price remains steady or even falls.20 These cheap
brands appear to perform two functions – they provide a route into the
market for price-sensitive (young) smokers and keep price sensitive
(poorer) smokers in the market.20 Such efforts are combined with
price-based marketing which has increased in importance consequent
to restrictions on other forms of marketing and is also targeted at the
least well off.60 Collectively they undermine the intended impact of
tobacco tax policy and are likely to explain inequalities in smoking
rates.20

Influencing Policy
Political Influence in LMICs
The evidence, including systematic reviews of tobacco industry
political activity, indicates that tobacco companies predominantly use
the same tactics and arguments repeatedly over time and across
jurisdictions.34,58,61 Consequently, the existing literature, despite its
predominant focus on HICs, can be used to anticipate and, therefore,
counter industry activities elsewhere.34 The evidence also suggests
some differences in approach, most notably that efforts to influence
health policy in LMICs are bolder and, where possible, take advantage
of state incapacity and corruption.41,62
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Overall tobacco companies continue to place considerable
emphasis on economic arguments, rely heavily on third parties, and
use litigation aggressively to weaken and prevent public health
measures.6,14,34,58,61,63 However, they have also adapted techniques to
take account of both challenges to their political legitimacy, now
formalised in Article 5.3 of the FCTC, and the opportunities presented
by globalisation. For example, in response to their declining political
legitimacy, they have increased their use of third parties64,65 and
attempted to signify a commitment to the public good by rebranding
their political activities as corporate social responsibility (CSR)
initiatives66–69 and exploiting the political opportunities presented by
harm reduction.10,11 In response to globalisation, tobacco companies
are now actively using economic agreements and the opportunities
presented by the global trade in illicit tobacco products to undermine
progress in tobacco control. As outlined below, both efforts restrict
informed scrutiny to experts - international lawyers or experts in illicit
tobacco - and particularly threaten countries without the financial
means to mount a legal defence or independently investigate the illicit
tobacco trade and industry involvement therein.

Misrepresenting the Costs and Benefits of Tobacco
Control
The tobacco industry tends to underplay the potential benefits of
proposed policies while emphasising their costs.34,70 Consequently,
despite the important work of the World Bank showing both the limited
economic dependence of LMICs on tobacco and substantial economic
benefits of tobacco control,71 the industry continues to exploit
policymakers’ misconceptions of the economic importance of tobacco,
limited knowledge of the socio economic benefits of tobacco control
and short-term interests in revenue generation..29,70,72,73
Its ability to do this is underpinned by efforts to shape
understanding of the economic impacts of tobacco through the
production of lopsided assessments of the economic benefits of
tobacco designed to create what, in most cases, is a false choice
between health and economic well-being.74–80 These reports highlight
foreign exchange earnings, public revenue and employment associated
with tobacco production (agriculture and manufacturing) and use
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(retail and hospitality), providing a foundation for alliance building with
tobacco supply chain workers.79,80 Predictably, however, they ignore
the economic and social costs associated with tobacco use and
growing, the fact that money not spent on tobacco will be spent on
other goods generating alternative employment and public revenue,71
and the potential for tobacco farmers, with targeted support, to
diversify.81
A key audience for such efforts is non-health ministries, whose
support is crucial to tobacco companies.14,63,82 Recent evidence from
Vietnam indicates that concerns over unemployment and public and
private debt in LMICs create a particularly receptive policy
environment for industry arguments: officials from departments with
interests in revenue generation took a “politics-as-usual” approach to
tobacco control, characterised by a low priority for health reform and
interdepartmental rivalry.73 This reinforces past studies focusing on
African and Western Pacific countries.29,63
Such efforts appear to enjoy particular influence in tobacco leafgrowing countries (Box 2).29 Yet, it is increasingly apparent that much
of the industry’s argumentation on tobacco farming is misleading.81
Claims that tobacco control measures in leaf-growing nations will
suddenly decimate tobacco farming when the majority of the crop is
exported and reductions in local consumption will be small and gradual
are simply not credible.81 The vast majority of LMICs are not
dependent on tobacco farming71 and economically sustainable
alternatives have been identified in various world regions.81 While their
application may be complex in some countries, perhaps particularly
Malawi and Zimbabwe, the only two heavily dependent on tobacco for
foreign earnings,71 continued dependence on tobacco also reflects
political choices. By refusing to sign the FCTC, countries like Malawi
have cut themselves adrift from international efforts to find
alternatives to tobacco through FCTC Articles 17 and 18. Government
inertia may also be explained by the dead hand of economic conflicts
of interest; Malawi has many high-ranking government officials who
grow tobacco.83 Serious concerns are also being raised about the
industry’s treatment of tobacco farmers, with bonded labour and child
labour key issues.81 In the absence of competition, tobacco companies
have control over leaf grading and price, and can lock farmers into a
repetitive cycle of debt in exchange for supplies.29,33 Consequently,
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tobacco farmers are increasingly supporting tobacco control and
diversification efforts. In Uganda, for example, a group of farmers who
had switched to growing alternative crops recently submitted a petition
to the Speaker of the Parliament in support of the Uganda Tobacco
Control Bill 2014, stating that “Tobacco growing is tantamount to
making a contract with poverty.”

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
CSR is increasingly central to the tobacco industry’s business
strategy, yet what appears under the rubric of this ill-defined term
indicates that CSR is aimed at maintaining their status as political
insiders with a legitimate role to play within health policymaking.15,66–68
BAT documents indicate that these considerations have driven its CSR
programmes from the outset:
“The approach should succeed in hauling us closer to a position of cooperation with governments and other important stakeholders in the
developed world, while helping to limit the spread of “demonisation”
from the developed world to the emerging markets..”89

CSR practices work politically by either facilitating conventional
political activities (by generating goodwill amongst policymakers, for
instance, charitable donations work to make access to political élites
more likely) or creating alternative means of putting conventional
political activities, such as constituency building and political access,
into effect.,14,67–69,90,91 Many initiatives do both by exploiting LMICs’
acute need for investment in social projects. Thus, BAT sponsored
community water projects and PMI sponsored education projects in
tobacco farming areas of Sri Lanka, East Africa and Colombia, for
example, build and maintain alliances with farming communities while
simultaneously emphasising the value of the industry to social and
economic development.67,92 This is taken to extreme lengths by
aligning industry charitable donations with governments’ objectives of
achieving the Millennium Development Goals in, for example, Nigeria
and Brazil.67,93,94 Given the practice of LMICs defending tobacco on the
basis of poverty alleviation and development, such approaches
promise to be highly effective.95 Certainly, internal industry documents
claim such activities enabled them to prevent advertising bans in
Sierra Leone and Uganda, and to weaken a tobacco bill in Kenya.96

Lancet, Vol 385, No. 9972 (March 14, 2015): pg. 1029-1043. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

12

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Tobacco industry CSR programmes’ underlying narrative of cooperation and commitment to “sensible” regulation97 also provide a
political lubricant for the industry’s other activities including the
partnerships they are attempting to establish on illicit tobacco (see
below). In Ecuador, for example, companies gained acceptance into
policymaking networks by emphasising a commitment to regulation
under the FCTC but then using the position to push for weak legislative
proposals.72,75,98 These are designed to have a limited effect on
tobacco consumption and, by filling regulatory space, decrease the
likelihood of tobacco legislation being strengthened in the
future.72,99,100 Continued industry demands to be part of national
governments’ efforts to develop tobacco legislation97,101,102 underline
the ongoing risk that such efforts pose to FCTC implementation. A
similar strategy involves voluntarily introducing weak versions of FCTC
measures with a view to preventing or delaying the implementation of
comprehensive ones. In the mid-2000s, BAT increased the size of
weak, text-only warnings on cigarette packs in Colombia, Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Trinidad & Tobago, it then taking several years for
these countries to eventually approve legislation mandating health
warnings aligned with Article 11 Guidelines.103

Constituency Building and Third Parties
The tobacco industry makes extensive use of third parties to
influence health policy in LMICs.34,61,75 Third party advocacy carries
greater weight with policy élites,104 colours policymakers’ perceptions
of the political risks associated with public health measures, and
amplifies tobacco industry messaging about the negative impacts of
policy, not least because news outlets frequently fail to expose the
underlying financial conflicts of interest.105 Different organisations are
used to manage different aspects of the regulatory environment.
International business organisations, such as the US Chamber of
Commerce and US-ASEAN Business Council,106 are used to lobby
officials on the legal and economic implications of public health
measures. For example, in 2013 and 2014 when Jamaica and Ireland,
respectively, were legislating on tobacco packaging (Jamaica
mandated pictorial health warnings covering 75% of the pack while
Ireland aims to introduce standardised packaging of tobacco products),
the US Chamber of Commerce wrote to both governments claiming the
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measures would contravene intellectual property obligations under
international trade and investment agreements.107,108 The International
Tax and Investment Center (ITIC), which describes itself as an
independent clearinghouse for best practices in taxation is, as
acknowledged on its website, sponsored by all four TTCs, which are
also represented on its Board of Directors.109 It hosts seminars,
publishes reports, and sponsors conferences on tobacco tax policy and
the illicit tobacco trade which promote the tobacco industry’s position
on these issues and give it “a seat at the policy-making table”.109 Such
tactics have proved successful in influencing tax policies in some
countries.109 In October 2014 it hosted a meeting for finance ministers
the day before the FCTC Conference of the Parties meeting (COP) in
Moscow where FCTC Article 6 guidelines on tobacco taxation were to
be agreed.109 Clearly intended to threaten progress of the guidelines,
ITIC billed the event as a pre-COP meeting giving the impression that
it was officially associated with the COP. This prompted WHO to write
to all parties explaining that the meeting “is in no manner supported
by the Convention Secretariat and cannot be considered as being in
any way linked to the COP”.110
The International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) was
established and continues to be funded by the industry as a “front” for
its “Third World lobby activities”.82,111 ITGA presents itself as the voice
of the tobacco farmer in contemporary tobacco policy conflicts.112 Its
financial links to tobacco companies are rarely disclosed111,112 although
it is increasingly clear they use ITGA strategically to oppose tobacco
control policies.82 Farmers are mobilised using misleading arguments
about the impacts of policies82 and encouraged to intervene using a
variety of means, including protests, media outreach, policy
submissions and promotion of research, to highlight the negative
economic impacts of public health measures.112,113 The tobacco
industry has even managed to have ITGA oppose FCTC Articles 17 and
18 which aim to help farmers by finding viable alternatives to tobacco
growing.82 Recently, civil society organisations and farmers groups in
Africa have launched a campaign highlighting the ITGA’s lack of
credibility and independence.114
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The use of international trade and investment
agreements and domestic litigation to deter and
challenge progress in tobacco control
The tobacco industry is increasingly using international trade
and investment agreements, including those overseen by the World
Trade Organization (WTO),115,116 and domestic litigation34,61 to
challenge existing and deter future tobacco control policies.115,116

Use of trade and investment agreements
Industry documents suggest argument that innovative health
warning policies including standardised packaging contravened trade
and investment treaties was developed as a deliberate strategy in the
1990s.115 Despite consistent legal advice that the agreements then in
existence did not offer protection, the industry successfully used these
arguments to deter policy implementation.115 With the growing number
of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties including the emerging
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) between the
EU and US and Transpacific Partnership (TPP), involving 12 countries
and approximately 40% of world trade, this trend looks set to
intensify. Moreover, given changes in the nature of such agreements
and evidence of industry efforts to influence their content in ways that
make it easier to challenge policies, these agreements may now pose
even greater challenges to tobacco control.116–118 Key concerns are
that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) enhance intellectual property
rights and, in contrast to most current major economic agreements
which only allow governments to lodge formal complaints, give
corporations legal standing to directly challenge governments’
regulation though investor state dispute settlement (ISDS)
arrangements. ISDS arbitration can be costly and uncertain and grants
compensation (not sanctioned retaliation, like in the WTO), thereby
significantly increasing the financial risks to countries facing such
disputes.116,117
Although corporations are unable to directly bring a case to
WTO, certain LMIC governments appear willing to act as tobacco
industry puppets. Currently, five countries – Ukraine (DS434),
Honduras (DS435), the Dominican Republic (DS441), Cuba (DS458)
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and Indonesia (DS467) – are complainants in a formal WTO dispute
against Australia’s standardised packaging legislation. These countries,
alongside other (predominantly leaf-producing) LMICs, also challenged
Australia for many months before the formal dispute within WTO
committees119 and expressed concerns about the European Union’s
Tobacco Product’s Directive when notified to the WTO in 2013.120
Similar countries, Malawi among them, continue to vocally challenge
other’ tobacco control measures in the WTO including bans on tobacco
additives Canada and Brazil.121,122
These disputes are rarely genuinely about trade. They are rather
about the threat that regulation poses to tobacco companies and their
ability to convince governments to challenge such innovation on their
behalf. In the case of standardised packs in Australia, the
complainants’ do not export large volumes of tobacco products to
Australia, if at all.123 Instead, PMI or BAT funding for four of the five
claims against Australia has been acknowledged.124,125 In Malawi, the
tobacco industry is thoroughly integrated into official international
trade policymaking – it plays leadership roles on the National Working
Group on Trade Policy and the Private-Public Dialogue Forum.126,127
While the tobacco industry is clearly adept at cultivating strong
political ties in countries where tobacco growing is widespread, it is
also apparent that they take advantage of poor governance and
corruption: 18 of the 27 countries that directly challenged Canada’s
ban on tobacco additives scored in the corrupt or highly corrupt range
on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and
only 3 in the “Clean” range.128
LMICs have also been the victims of industry efforts to use
economic treaties to threaten innovative tobacco control policies both
historically129,130 and recently. Uruguay is currently defending its large,
graphic warning labels in international arbitration.131 PMI (with 2013
revenues of more than US$59 billion and profits near $9 billion132)
claims that Uruguay (with total budget revenues of approximately $17
billion and expenditures of $19 billion133) is violating the provisions of
a BIT that the country has with Switzerland (PMI’s corporate home),
even though Article 2.1 of the BIT clearly provides for a public health
exception.134 Without an international NGO, Bloomberg Philanthropies,
supporting its legal costs, Uruguay would likely have abandoned its
regulatory efforts.135
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Use of Domestic Litigation
Tobacco companies are aggressive litigants, bringing legal
challenges even when their own advisers indicate that action is likely
to fail,136 and reports suggest a fourfold increase in tobacco industry
litigation against public health measures between 2005 and 2011.137
Such challenges seek to delay, overturn or weaken (allowing, for
example, smoking in ventilated areas or limiting the size of health
warnings (Box 3))138 public health measures. Amongst other
measures, proposals in LMICs to increase the size of health warnings
(Thailand,139 Sri Lanka,140,141 Nepal142) and introduce graphic health
warnings (Paraguay,143 Philippines1,144), and restrictions on public
smoking (Uganda,138 Kenya,138 Mexico,79,145 Argentina,1,146 Brazil1),
marketing (South Africa,138,140 Panama,1 Colombia1, Brazil1), and
additives (Brazil147–149) have all recently been challenged in national
courts. Interestingly, many of these cases fail,1,138,140– 142,150–152
reflecting a similar pattern in Europe.1,136,140 Given the frequency with
which court challenges are made and the breadth of measures that
have been subject to legal challenge, the number of informal threats of
litigation to policymakers that never come to light but may have
deterred progress in tobacco control is likely to be significant.34

Box 3
BAT’s efforts to challenge health warning legislation in Sri
Lanka
In August 2012 the Sri-Lankan Ministry of Health passed regulations
requiring pictorial health warning covering 80% of the front and back
of tobacco packs and in February 2014, the Sri-Lankan parliament
approved legislation to this end. Meanwhile, however, Ceylon Tobacco
Company (CTC), a BAT subsidiary, has brought a series of legal
challenges against the legislation that have led ultimately to a
significant delay in implementation and a shrinking in size of the
warnings to 60%.
The initial lawsuit claimed the regulations were impossible to
implement, the company would only comply if the requirements were
“reasonable” (35% of the pack surface) and that the Ministry of Health
did not have the authority to issue such regulations. The case went
through several layers of the court system which at one point
suggested that both parties settle with the Ministry of Health reducing
the size of the warnings, a suggestion it refused, until CTC ultimately
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filed the case in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court first delayed
implementation of the warnings before ruling, in May 2014, that the
Ministry of Health had the right to impose the health warnings but
ordered a reduction in size to between 50–60% of the pack surface.
The new warnings were due to be in place by July 1st 2014 but, just
two weeks before that, CTC filed a further appeal with the Supreme
Court requesting a 10–11 months extension to the date of
implementation for the company to sell already available stocks. On
July 11th 2014 a final ruling has delayed the 60% pictorial health
warnings until January 1 2015.

Sources:141,153

Tobacco smuggling
The availability of cheap, illicit tobacco undermines attempts to
reduce tobacco use and is a public health concern which has prompted
the inclusion of an Illicit Trade Protocol within the FCTC. Yet a far
greater concern is the way the tobacco industry is increasingly
manipulating the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain in ways
that seriously threaten progress in tobacco control. Tobacco companies
make their profit when they sell to the distributor and whether the
cigarettes are then sold through legal or illegal channels makes little
difference. However, the sale of cigarettes through illegal channels has
a number of advantages for tobacco companies (Web Box 1). Despite
overwhelming evidence of the industry’s historical involvement in
cigarette smuggling (Web Box 1) and growing evidence of ongoing
complicity, for example through over-producing or over-supplying
markets with product that then leaks into illicit channels,154–156 tobacco
companies have managed to shift the illicit tobacco issue from a public
relations disaster in which they were identified as the pariah supplier
of illicit product157,158 to a public relations success story in which they
are increasingly perceived as the victim of and solution to the problem.
Through their assiduous efforts over recent years, tobacco companies
have effectively hijacked the Illicit Trade Protocol (Box 4) and are
actively using the threat of illicit to counter tobacco control policies by
arguing, misleadingly, that tobacco control policies drive increases in
illicit.58,59,159,160
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Box 4
The tobacco industry’s ongoing attempts to infiltrate and
undermine global efforts to address cigarette smuggling
The illicit trade protocol (ITP), a supplementary treaty to the FCTC,
was adopted in November 2012 and puts technology, via a global track
and trace system, at the heart of addressing illicit tobacco. It specifies
clearly that the tobacco industry should play no part in such a system.
Leaked industry documents show the TTCs had prepared for this by
secretly developing a plan to promote Codentify, a pack labelling
system developed and controlled by PMI, as the track and trace
system of choice. Not only does Codentify not meet the ITP
requirements for a track and trace system, 178 but this would put the
TTCs in control of a global system seeking to address the illicit tobacco
trade in which they have been extensively involved. Further, it directly
contravenes both Article 5.3 and the ITP’s requirement for the system
to be independent of industry.
In 2011 the four TTCs collectively established the Digital Coding and
Tracking Association (DCTA) in Switzerland to collaborate with
governments and international organisations and promote Codentify,
and PMI alone donated Euro15 million to INTERPOL, the world’s largest
police organisation. By July 2012, DCTA had begun working with
INTERPOL to make Codentify accessible to law enforcement agencies
globally via INTERPOL’s Global Register. Subsequent to the donation,
Interpol controversially applied for Observer Status at the November
2012 Conference of the Parties claiming its ability to coordinate and
facilitate international cooperation to eliminate illicit trade would be an
asset.154,164
In 2014, the industry’s DCTA was a major sponsor of the World
Customs Organisation conference on illicit tobacco in Brisbane,
Australia. KPMG’s Robin Cartwright presented in DCTA’s timeslot but
his presentation did not mention that he is leading a £10million project
on behalf of PMI.154,179 Simultaneously, KPMG and GS1 UK launched a
new report promoting Codentify.180 While this report acknowledges
that KPMG has worked for the tobacco industry and cites funding from
DCTA, it fails to note that DCTA is effectively the tobacco industry.
As part of their apparent efforts to further ingratiate themselves with
the international law enforcement community, in 2011 PMI donated
55,000Euros to the International Anti- Corruption Academy,181 an
organisation initiated by the European Antifraud Office (OLAF) and the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)182 to provide anti-corruption
education and research.
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Tobacco companies have worked assiduously to achieve this
position by taking advantage of the complexity of the issue and using
their resource advantage to dominate every aspect of the debate.
First, by commissioning reports and surveys, tobacco companies have
come to control the data and evidence on illicit and use this to
dominate media coverage, secure access to authorities and promote
industry messaging on illicit,161–163 for example that illicit is driven by
public health policies rather than weaknesses in customs and law
enforcement and that counterfeiting and intellectual property crime are
the primary concerns.164 The volume of industry reports of this nature
produced in recent years has been overwhelming, making it impossible
for tobacco control groups to adequately respond. Where industry
evidence and data from Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America and
Australia have been examined, they have been found to be seriously
flawed, to significantly exaggerate the scale of illicit (and the
counterfeit element) and underplay industry involvement.154,161,163,165–
170

Second, tobacco companies fund activities under the umbrella of
CSR (training for border patrol and customs officials, funding for sniffer
dogs171–173) to further cement access and signal the need for
“partnership” between industry and authorities. These activities have
enjoyed success as far afield as Azerbaijan, Mali, Namibia, South
Africa, as well as at supranational level (Box 4).174 Consequently
tobacco companies are now cooperating, both formally and informally,
with various governments and intergovernmental agencies, contrary to
Article 5.3. Alongside extensive CSR efforts (see above) and claimed
commitments to harm reduction (which have hitherto largely featured
in HICs10,11), such efforts are undoubtedly intended to counter the
TTCs’ gradual exclusion from the policy arena and undermine Article
5.3. More worryingly, if the norm of cooperation the industry is
seeking to establish in illicit trade seeps over into other areas of policy,
it threatens tobacco control more generally.175
Third, tobacco companies have been funding a growing number
of third parties – organisations and individuals (notably ex-policemen)
- who provide credibility and are deliberately used as ‘media
messengers’ or report authors, their links to industry rarely
disclosed.176 The 2014 report produced by KPMG for the tobacco
industry’s Digital Coding and Tracking Association (Box 4) and ITIC’s
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activities (see above) are just recent examples. Press coverage
frequently fails to expose industry backing for these reports or their
inaccuracy.162
Collectively such efforts are enjoying considerable success and
should be seen as part of the industry’s audacious attempt to secure
control over the Illicit Trade Protocol and ensure it is put in charge of
the global track and trace system that the protocol envisages as
addressing global cigarette smuggling (Box 4). Yet the danger of
regulatory capture with the industry coming to control both the data
on and how the illicit trade is dealt with is illustrated by the legally
binding deals reached between the four TTCs and the European
Commission, which growing evidence suggests have failed. While data
show that genuine tobacco industry products are still being smuggled
in significant volumes in the EU, the payments TTCs have had to make
have been so tiny as to provide no effective disincentive.156,177 If a
legally binding deal in a well-resourced jurisdiction has failed, this
raises major concerns about the deals, binding and voluntary,
negotiated elsewhere. As experts note, no deal with the tobacco
industry has ever led to a positive outcome for public health.174

The Way Forward
Addressing tobacco industry interference should be simple. FCTC
Article 5.3 guidelines outline the measures needed,7 technical reports
flesh these out in detail,183–186 while this paper shows that industry
tactics are repeated over time and place and could therefore be
predicted and countered.34 Yet, while growing numbers of countries
have taken steps to prevent tobacco industry interference, successful
implementation of Article 5.3 is almost non-existent.174
In practice, countering tobacco industry influence is complex.
Even[0] where efforts have been made to implement Article 5.3,
tobacco companies offset such efforts by expanding their use of third
parties, changing the regulatory architecture in a way that cements
corporate access and influence12,13,187,188 and influencing economic
agreements to enable them to challenge policies.117 Tobacco
companies will continue to secure access and influence as long as it
remains acceptable to do so. A necessary first step, therefore, and a
pre-requisite to advancing tobacco control, is to change attitudes to
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the tobacco industry. This requires civil society to actively monitor and
publicise industry misconduct (as detailed in Article 5.3) and for
ministries of health to help disseminate these findings within
government and beyond. As tobacco companies spend millions each
year attempting to rehabilitate their image189–192 and as institutional
memories are short, such efforts must be ongoing. It is no coincidence
that the countries (in all income groups) with the most successful
tobacco control policies also have the most active programmes of
industry monitoring (witness Thailand, Brazil, UK, Australia)14,193 and
that recent progress in others has come in part though recognition of
industry malfeasance and efforts to implement 5.3 (Box 5). While such
efforts currently focus at the national level, industry influence also
increasingly occurs at supranational level (the deals with INTERPOL,
lobbying by ITIC and regional business organisations, for example). To
address this, parties to the FCTC must cooperate, share knowledge,
raise awareness among and hold intergovernmental agencies to
account, and ensure that industry activity beyond national boundaries
is monitored and reported. While WHO has a mandate to monitor the
industry’s supranational activity, funding for such efforts would need to
be met by member states or international NGOs. Finally, TTCs’ HIC
host governments should play a more active role in holding TTCs to
account. In contrast to Switzerland (now home to two TTCs, PMI and
Japan Tobacco International), the UK government (home to BAT and
Imperial Tobacco) has made a start in developing guidelines for
diplomatic posts.194

Box 5
Progress in the Philippines
In January 2013, after a hard-fought political battle against the
tobacco industry (led by PMI) and its allies, and following active efforts
to implement Article 5.3,183 the Philippines government implemented a
major reform of tobacco excise tax structure and rates including
hypothecating the tax for health purposes. The reform sought to
eventually eliminate a structure that favoured incumbent firms and
kept taxes and therefore prices of tobacco products low. Though the
country has long endured a reputation for poor governance and
corruption195,196, governments can change. In this case, there was
strong overt support for the reform from the highest political levels,
including the President, the finance minister, the commissioner of the
revenue authority and the leaders in both houses of the national
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legislature197,198 More importantly for countries seeking to replicate this
success, the government successfully linked the reform strongly to
health, both in terms of mitigating tobacco use but also by earmarking
hypothecating the vast proportion of new revenues to providing
universal health coverage to the country’s most vulnerable
populations. These linkages engendered widespread legislative and
public support, which ensured the reform’s success. As of mid-2014,
early estimates suggest that tax revenues have increased and are
going to the earmarked hypothecated programs, and smoking
prevalence among the young and those of lower income are now
declining.199,200

This approach does not overlook the fact that industry influence
is a manifestation of the inequalities in power and resources between
TTCs on one hand, and nation states and civil society on the other.
This is particularly the case in LMICs. Instead it recognises that this
resource imbalance can only be directly addressed through radical
measures that curtail the tobacco industry’s excess profits19 or
fundamentally alter its structure.201 The difficulties countries face in
implementing even simple tobacco control policies underline that these
more radical ‘endgame’ solutions, while much needed, are unlikely to
be achieved without first changing attitudes to the industry through
the actions above.
Yet, while the ability of tobacco control policies to rapidly reduce
non-communicable diseases in LMICs is widely recognised, the political
complexities of implementing such measures are overlooked.9 The
Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use are
exceptional in recognising this problem and supporting policy advocacy
for tobacco control, including efforts to address tobacco industry
interference. However, until this need is more widely recognised and
tobacco control embedded more firmly in the development agenda,
progress will remain slow. Economies of scale can be realised by
collectively addressing the corporate vectors of NCDs, including
tobacco, alcohol, processed food and sugary drinks, and the shared
mechanisms (eg international economic agreements) though which
their influence is mediated.202,203 Governments should also look to,
polluter pays principles, hypothecated taxes or price regulation19 to
fund these efforts.
Governments and civil society must also look to implement
other elements of Article 5.3 (including limiting interactions with
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industry and ensuring their transparency, rejecting partnerships with
industry, avoiding conflicts of interest for officials, denormalising
activities industry describes as “socially responsible”). Most ministries
of health are now cognisant of tobacco industry misconduct and the
requirements of 5.3 and can therefore play a key role in informing
other government departments. While departments seeking to control
illicit tobacco may need to meet with and obtain data from the tobacco
industry, they should ensure such interactions meet the standards of
transparency required of Article 5.3 and learn to treat industry data
with scepticism. Similarly civil society and ministries of health must
urge governments to reverse any agreements tobacco companies have
hitherto secured with governments. Prospectively, progress on Article
5.3 is likely to be enabled by first implementing the most feasible
measures. For example, many countries have codes of conduct for civil
service to which guidance for interaction with the tobacco industry
could be added and provisions consistent with 5.3 can be added to
tobacco control legislation as it is being developed. More broadly,
improving standards of governance and transparency in policing
making and public life and ensuring greater public health involvement
in trade and investment agreement negotiations would help.
Beyond this, a number of specific technical interventions should
help address industry interference in LMICs and beyond. Technical
support and capacity building is needed to enable parties to deal with
legal challenges to tobacco control via both domestic courts and
international dispute settlement mechanisms and is being addressed
via the relevant knowledge hubs.204 Investigative research and
capacity building in illicit tobacco is needed to further understand and
address this complex issue. Updated research that directly addresses
industry economic arguments, including those on tobacco farming, is
also needed alongside efforts to accelerate the development of FCTC
Article 17 and 18 guidelines on support for economically viable
alternative alternatives to tobacco. Moving forward, LMICs must guard
against industry efforts to alter the regulatory architecture, for
example through the application of Better Regulation principles and
business impact assessments, which have been shown to embed and
enable corporate influence.12,13,188
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Conclusion
Tobacco industry interference with governments’ efforts to
implement tobacco control policies remains one of the greatest
challenges to preventing the harm caused by this industry. Tobacco
companies continue to promote their lethal product and circumvent or
prevent development and implementation of effective tobacco control
policies. While select countries in all income groups, including those
where the industry is a significant economic player,193 show that
actively addressing tobacco industry misconduct is achievable and
enables effective tobacco control, elsewhere, despite a legal obligation
to implement the FCTC, progress is lamentably slow and an epidemic
that could be prevented continues to escalate. While debate centres on
whether progress can be most rapidly achieved through
implementation of FCTC provisions or moving to more radical
‘endgame’ solutions, actively addressing tobacco industry interference
is a pre-requisite to both. Changing attitudes to the tobacco industry
through actively monitoring and exposing its conduct is an essential
first step.
5 key points panel










The tobacco industry’s future depends on increasing tobacco use in
low and middle income countries (LMICs), especially among women
and youth and contrary to industry claims, tobacco marketing
deliberately targets these groups. High levels of marketing are
documented in LMICs.
Tobacco companies consistently contest and seek to circumvent
governments’ authority to implement public health measures using
highly misleading arguments frequently presented via third parties
whose links to industry are obscured.
In LMICs, tobacco companies harness their resource advantages in
establishing partnerships with governments to address the trade in
illicit tobacco in which there is evidence of their complicity and in
using the threat of domestic litigation and arbitration under
economic agreements (rarely drawing on the original intent of
these agreements) to intimidate governments against
comprehensive tobacco control measures.
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and
its guidelines offer governments a set of strategies to protect
public health against the tobacco industry’s appalling conduct, but
are underutilised.
An essential first step in addressing tobacco industry interference is
changing attitudes to the industry through actively monitoring and
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exposing its conduct. Exemplar countries show that such efforts
underpin the development of effective tobacco control.
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Supplementary Material
Web appendix
Table w1: The global tobacco industry (2013 data)
Company
Chinese National Tobacco Company
(CNTC)
Philip Morris International (PMI)

% share world
cigarette volume
43.2%

Leading brands

British American Tobacco (BAT)

11.6%

Japan Tobacco International (JTI)
Imperial Tobacco

9.4%
4.9%

Main private companies in US
market: Altria, Reynolds American,
Lorillard*, Liggett Vector Brands
Other private companies outside
US**(most co-owned by one of the
TTCs)
State run companies+ other than
CNTC
Private label (supermarkets’ own
brand tobacco)
Others (companies with less than
0.1% global market share)

4.5% -

Hongtashan, BaiSham Red Dragon, Shuangxi,
Hongqiqu, Huangguoshu, Hongmei
Marlboro, L&M, Bond Street, Philip Morris,
Parliament Virginia Slims
Pall Mall, Kent, Dunhill, Derby, Lucky Strike,
Kent, Vogue
Winston, Mild Seven, Camel, L&D
Gauloises, Davidoff, West, JPS, Marquise,
Fortuna, Ducados, Lambert and Butler
n/a

5.7%

n/a

3%

n/a

0.1%

n/a

3.4%

n/a

14.3%

Source: Euromonitor 1
*In July 2014 Lorillard and Reynolds American (RAI) entered into an agreement in
which RAI agreed to acquire Lorillard. As part of this acquisition Imperial Tobacco will
acquire Lorillard’s Maverick cigarette brand and e-cigarette brand Blu, and will also
acquire RAI’s cigarette brands KOOL, Salem and Winston.
** ITC (India), Gudang Garam (Indonesia), KT&G (South Korea), Djarum PT
(Indonesia), Donskoy Tabak (Russia), Neman Tobacco Factory Grodno (Belarus),
Nojorono Tobacco Indonesia PT, Mighty Corp (Philippines), Godfrey Phillips India Ltd,
VST Industries Ltd (India), Adris Grupa dd (Croatia), Bulgartabac Holding AD
(Bulgaria).
+ Vietnam National Tobacco Corp, Eastern Co SAE (Egypt), Thailand Tobacco
Company, Société Nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes (Algeria), Iranian Tobacco Co,
Taiwan Tobacco & Liquor Corporation, and Régie Nationale des Tabacs et des
Allumettes (Tunisia)

Web Box 1: The ways in cigarette smuggling can benefit the
tobacco industry and evidence of industry complicity
It is important to note that tobacco companies make their profit when they sell to
the distributor and whether the cigarettes are then sold through legal or illegal
channels makes little difference. However, sale through illegal channels has a
number of advantages for the industry (as well as obvious risks):
1. It bypasses tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and thereby gets cigarettes into
otherwise closed or protected markets, a key market entry technique that tobacco
companies have used extensively in the past.
2. Smuggled cigarettes either have no excise duties on them or duties from a lower
tax jurisdiction meaning they are sold more cheaply than they should. This means
more sales, particularly to the young and the poor who are the most price-sensitive.
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3. Despite evidence of involvement in the illicit trade, tobacco companies have used
it to shape policy in their own interest by arguing that demand for the illicit
product, rather than its supply drives the problem. For example, in countries where
they want to invest, they argued that the presence of illicit signals a need for
foreign investment (rather than the involvement of the potential foreign investors).
Elsewhere, they argued that illicit is driven by high taxes and will fall if they are
reduced.
Through the 1990s overwhelming evidence emerged that cigarette smuggling was a
core part of tobacco industry business, actively used on a global basis. This
prompted investigations and lawsuits and it had generally been assumed that
industry involvement in the trade had ceased. Emerging evidence suggests this may
not be the case and that, while the way in which industry cigarettes are smuggled
may have changed, some degree of complicity continues and at the very least
tobacco companies continue to overproduce or over-supply cigarettes in the
apparent knowledge they will leak into the illicit market.
Sources: 2-28
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